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capture and storage project in Mid-Norway 
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support to the project due to spillovers in learning, i.e. 
knowledge with public good features. 
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Preface 
This report on the social and private value of the Halten CO2 project is part of a broader study. The 
aim of the study is to assess institutional, political and legislative issues associated with the planned 
industrial project “CO2 value chain from Tjeldbergodden to Draugen and Heidrun”, for short “the 
Halten CO2 project”. The report is supplemented by a report on implementation issues under climate 
policy,  written by CICERO (Torvanger et al. 2007) and a report on legislative issues, written by the 
Scandinavian Institute of Marine Law at University of Oslo (Berger, 2007). The three reports are part 
of a main study of the Halten CO2 project, with the objective of evaluating the likely future conditions 
for CO2 capture and storage projects in general and the Halten CO2 project in particular. 
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1 Introduction 
In this short report we compare the social and private value of the Halten CO2 project. If the 
social value is the larger, one can make a case for public subsidies to the project or another 
form of public intervention. The analysis is mainly based on economic theory. The discussion 
in this report is qualitative and no numerical examples are included. Therefore we are not in a 
position to draw a specific conclusion regarding the social and private value of the Halten 
CO2 project. 
The social value is defined as the net value of the project for Norway, which is all benefits 
of the project, subtracted all costs. The private value is defined as the benefits of the project 
for private investors, subtracted their costs. This approach assumes that taxes or an emission 
quota system that correct for the global warming effect of CO2 emissions are not fully in place 
since in that case the social and private value would coincide. A full account of the warming 
effect of CO2 would put a price on emissions equal to the marginal damage (i.e. a ‘Pigovian’ 
tax), and would also provide an equal subsidy for capturing and storing CO2. 
The Halten CO2 project is an early CO2 value chain in Mid-Norway initiated by Shell and 
Statoil. It consists of four main components, where the first is a 860 MW gas-fired power 
plant linked to the methanol production facility at Tjeldbergodden. The power plant can also 
supply electricity offshore and contribute to regional electricity supply. The second 
component is facilities at Tjeldbergodden for capture of up to 2.25 Mt CO2 annually. These 
emissions are associated with the power plant, transportation of the CO2 to the Draugen and 
Heidrun oil reservoirs and injection of CO2 at these sites. The third is enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) at the Draugen and Heidrun oil reservoirs, and possibly other sites, which after the end 
of the project can serve as final storage for the CO2. The fourth and last component is an 
aquifer, likely close to the Heidrun reservoir, which can be used for final storage of captured 
CO2 that is not permanently trapped in one of the oil reservoirs. The elements of the Halten 
CO2 project are described in some greater detail in Torvanger et al. (2007).  
Recently, the feasibility of the EOR component of the Halten CO2 project has been thrown 
into doubt. A study by Shell and Statoil concluded that CO2-assisted EOR is not feasible at 
the Draugen field. The EOR potential at the Heidrun field is still being assessed. In case use 
of CO2 from Tjeldbergodden for EOR purposes is not deemed feasible at all, there is still a 
possibility that the companies and the Norwegian government will agree on plans for a 
Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) concept based on storage of CO2 in a nearby 
aquifer. 
Public subsidies to CCS projects in Norway raise other issues, such as government 
subsidies being legitimate under European Economic Area (EEA) rules. However, such issues 
are outside of the scope of this report.  
Another issue outside the scope of this brief report is the role of the Norwegian tax system 
on petroleum activity for the comparison of private and social value of CCS, and more 
specifically the Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) component, see Jakobsen et al. (2005). A 
large share of the profits from enhanced oil recovery accrue to the state, and the high tax rate 
could potentially mean that companies do not carry out some projects that have a positive 
social value. (This debate includes a counterargument, namely that costs are covered by the 
state through the same tax system at a similar rate). 
Government intervention could also be called for due to coordination problems generated 
by different ownership of different links in the CO2 value chain. Such coordination problems 
are more important to the extent that the Halten CO2 project is seen as the first step towards a 
larger linked infrastructure covering more sources, oilfields and aquifers. Government 
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intervention, possibly through ownership, is furthermore a solution if a large-scale pipeline 
infrastructure is being planned. This is due to ‘economies of scale’ (decreasing cost) in such 
infrastructure, which makes optimal pricing of transport services in pipelines difficult. 
The present analysis focuses on the social value of the CCS and EOR elements of the 
Halten CO2 project. It does not address potential costs and benefits of building the power 
plant itself. We then discuss the social value of carrying out the CCS and related EOR 
components, compared with a situation where a similar gas-fired power plant is built without 
CCS. Current concerns for electricity supply in the region offer some reasons to expect that 
new gas-fired electricity generating capacity will be introduced. Government involvement in 
such a project may also be motivated by electricity supply concerns (in the region and to 
offshore facilities) in combination with political targets. These concerns will not be addressed 
here. We thus start our analysis by assuming that a deficit in electricity supply in the Mid-
Norway region leads to construction of a gas-fired power station at Tjeldbergodden. In the 
reference scenario the power station is built without CCS facilities. This implies that 
emissions from the power station must likely be covered through purchase of emission 
quotas. Two CCS scenarios are compared to the reference scenario. In the first CCS scenario 
a gas-fired power station with CCS and EOR is constructed, see section 2. This scenario is in 
line with the original Halten CO2 plans. In the second CCS scenario a gas-fired power station 
with CCS but no EOR is constructed, see section 3. 
2 Social versus private value of the Halten CO2 project 
To illustrate the principle issues involved we look at a schematic case of a CCS project that is 
to be realized or not. The project involves a gas-fired power station, capture facilities, and 
pipeline to storage sites. CO2 is stored in oil reservoirs suitable for EOR. In addition an 
aquifer is included, suitable for storing CO2 that is not permanently stored in the oil 
reservoirs. 
Now there are two questions that must be answered for the government to consider public 
support in terms of contributing to funding of the project: 
a) Is the project sufficiently profitable to be realized based on the private investors’ 
interest in the project (i.e. is the private value positive and large enough)? 
b) In case the answer to a) is no, is the social value larger than the private value, and 
is it positive and sufficiently large such that the government wants the project 
realized? (An additional question not addressed here is if it has a positive social 
value, but with a larger positive value when buying quotas in stead of using 
CCS.) 
A CCS project is only candidate for government subsidies given that the answer to question a) 
is no and the answer to question b) is yes. With a) being answered affirmatively, we shall 
understand that the investor finds that the CCS project has a positive value under a quota 
market, the assumption being that quotas will have to be purchased in full either for the small 
emissions after CCS or for the large emissions without CCS. If the answer to a) is yes the 
project should in any case be realized without public subsidies, no matter if social value is 
larger than private value. 
CO2 value chains with EOR have been seen as the most promising route to the realization 
of CCS projects. However, so far most studies conclude that such CO2 value chains do not 
have a positive private value and it is not certain that the social value is positive, see e.g. 
Gassco et al. (2006). The value of EOR is i.a. sensitive with regard to oil price, the climate 
value of storing CO2 (i.e. the quota price), and large investments in the value chain in terms of 
pipelines and CO2 capture facilities. In the case of CCS projects we therefore assume that the 
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answer to question a) is no. Thus the more interesting question is b). In this brief report we 
will limit the focus to discuss reasons why the social value may be higher than the private 
value, which is a prerequisite for public subsidies to CCS projects. We will not discuss what 
share public subsidies should have of the total project cost. The government could either 
supply enough additional funding that the project will be sufficiently profitable for the project 
developers and thus be realized, even if this is less than the additional social value. 
Alternatively the government could give a public subsidy equal to the whole difference 
between social and private value. (In the interest of building a CCS plant at minimal cost 
authorities could use a specially designed contract – referred to as an “incentive contract” in 
economics.) 
In the following we discuss some reasons why the social value of a CCS project could be 
larger than the private value, and to what extent these apply to the Halten CO2 project.  
2.1 Technological innovation and spillover effects 
For CO2 capture and storage to mature as a greenhouse gas mitigation option, technological 
improvements are still required to reduce costs and further improve confidence in the 
reliability of storage. Today projected CCS costs by far exceed estimated quota prices for the 
next couple of decades. This requires research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of 
new technologies. But equally important, it requires practical experience with designing and 
operating integrated CCS systems on a commercial scale. Such experience should lead to 
learning-by-doing benefits and potential cost savings. While CO2-assisted EOR is an 
established industry practice onshore, it has not been tried in offshore oil fields. Adapting 
methods for CO2-assisted EOR to an offshore context would also involve learning benefits. 
From economic theory it is well established that there is likely to be underinvestment in 
technologies by private companies since the social value is higher than the private value. 
Other firms will learn from the investing firms’ efforts, so benefits of the efforts are not fully 
captured by the investors. In economic terms this is an example of a positive externality. This 
is likely the case for CCS technologies. Both with regard to RD&D and learning by doing 
there is likely to be substantial spillover benefits, meaning benefits from the project that 
accrue to others than the project owners. The experience gained making CCS less costly and 
more feasible has a value to other prospective investors, firms and nations involved or 
interested in CCS. For Norway and the global community there could be a very high value to 
improved CCS technologies and industrial application if CCS turns out to be one of a few 
major options to mitigate man-made climate change through reducing CO2 emissions. Such 
benefits could accrue to owners of fossil reserves, owners of storage sites, users of fossil 
fuels, and engineering firms, etc. The external benefits of knowledge generation are generally 
acknowledged to be the rationale for government funding of education and research, and 
more so for basic research than for applied research. In the applied end, protection of 
intellectual property is instituted by government to facilitate private rewards, and often is 
supplemented with subsidies for early application (one example is subsidies for renewable 
energy sources). 
If the social value of a project is higher than the private value, government intervention 
could take the form of subsidies, direct regulation, or (partly) public ownership to make 
certain that the project is carried out. In the more general case where the scale of the project 
can be varied, government subsidies could make certain that the scale of the project becomes 
as large as prescribed by the social value. Asymmetric information on the private value of the 
project could be a challenge in such a setting, since private investors have incentives to 
understate the private value of the project in a situation where public subsidies are possible. 
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What sets the Halten CO2 project apart from similar projects under way in Norway 
(Mongstad, Kårstø) and also most planned projects abroad is that it involves an offshore EOR 
component, and final storage of some of the CO2 in abandoned offshore oil fields. The 
offshore EOR features of the project are most likely to lead to large learning benefits. Thus 
inclusion of EOR in the project could be an argument for a relatively larger public funding. 
The post-combustion capture and aquifer storage elements will be less unique to the Halten 
CO2 project, and the spillover effects from technological learning would probably offer less 
compelling arguments for government contributions in case the EOR component is scrapped. 
Still, this would be an early full-scale CCS project, which would contribute to the learning 
curve for capture, transportation and storage along with other projects. A scenario where a 
Halten CCS project is completed without EOR is discussed in section 3. 
A related angle on improved CCS technologies is to consider this as a type of “global 
public good”. The two requirements for a pure public good is non–rivalry in consumption, 
which means that one consumer’s use of the good does not reduce the value of the good to 
others, and non-excludability, which means that the producer is unable to prevent others from 
using the good. The general result from economic theory that these features leads to too low 
investments in public goods by private interests, basically because they are not able reap 
(enough) profits for the investments. Thus there is a place for government intervention. 
One can argue that efficient (low-cost) CCS technologies has public good characteristics in 
the sense that knowledge of improved CCS technologies can be utilized across the World 
without diminishing the value for e.g. Norway or an oil company applying the technology to 
reduce its emissions. Of course the argumentation changes if this is seen from the perspective 
of the technology developer, who wants to reap profits from the investments made, for 
instance with the help of patents. One can also argue that the second criterion for a public 
good is satisfied since it is difficult to stop the diffusion of new, efficient CCS technologies. 
And even more strongly phrased, for the joint benefit of controlling man-made global 
warming this technology should have the widest diffusion possible. 
From this public good perspective there are thus further arguments for public subsidies for 
developing more efficient CCS technologies, both for securing large enough investments in 
such projects, and with a view to secure the widest possible diffusion of these technologies. In 
the case of a CCS project, possible solutions are funding support from the government (where 
there should be a clause related to less restrictions on diffusion of the technology, e.g. in 
terms of reduce patent period), or partly public ownership. Other alternatives for the 
government is to guarantee a fixed (and high enough) price on the captured and stored CO2 
from applying the technology, or organizing a bidding process whereby firms are invited to 
plan and construct CCS facilities that yields most mitigation of CO2 for a specified amount of 
money spent. 
2.2 Planning horizon and discount rate 
The value and profitability of a CCS project depends on assumptions made with regard to 
project horizon, discount rate, expectations on the climate value of capturing and storing a ton 
of CO2 at some point in future, expectations on cost of CCS per ton of CO2 in future, 
expectations on gas, oil and coal price, other energy sources, the potential of renewable 
energy sources and more energy-efficient equipment, etc. (see Barrio and Tangen 2006 for an 
assessment of CO2 price scenarios). Furthermore one must assess the level of risk investments 
are exposed to, and decide willingness to take on risk (that is compensation required to take 
on risk, measured as the degree of risk aversion, first and foremost for the government). 
In all these respects the government may make different assumptions or expectations 
compared to private firms. One example is that the government has a lower discount rate (or 
accepts a lower internal rate of return) since society’s climate strategy is based on a longer 
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time horizon. The focus of private firms is on optimal return on invested capital. Another 
example is risk attitude, where one could argue that society should be risk neutral, whereas 
private investors have some degree of risk aversion. 
Such differences in assumptions can lead to a CCS project being less attractive for private 
investors but the government wants it realized. Again this is an example of a situation where 
public support, e.g. in terms of investment subsidies, could be warranted. 
3 The Halten CO2 project without EOR 
Offshore EOR and permanent CO2 storage in oil reservoirs are the components that most 
clearly set the Halten CO2 project apart from other CCS projects underway in Norway 
(Mongstad, Kårstø) and also most planned projects abroad. These are therefore the elements 
likely involving the most important learning-by-doing and spillover benefits. 
However, it appears that the use of CO2 for EOR in the Draugen and Heidrun fields may 
not be economically attractive from a private viewpoint. Given this, an alternative scenario 
that the developers and the government of Norway may consider is a pure CCS project with 
post-combustion capture at Tjeldbergodden and storage in an aquifer on the continental shelf.  
The post-combustion capture and aquifer storage elements will not be unique to the Halten 
CO2 project. Without EOR, the characteristics of the project would be less distinct from other 
planned and ongoing efforts. Consequently, the spillover effects from technological learning 
would probably offer less compelling arguments for government contributions to this 
particular project under this alternative scenario. 
That is not to say that there would be no learning benefits from the project. It would still be 
an early full-scale CCS project, which would contribute to the learning curve for capture, 
transportation and storage along with other projects. Arguably there is a need for a large 
number of full-scale CCS demonstration projects worldwide. 
In order to maximize the social value of a Halten CO2 project without an EOR component, 
one can take a close look at how the project can be designed so as to incorporate new 
technological solutions and design elements where there seems to be a promising learning-by-
doing potential. Such elements may strengthen the case for government subsidies. 
4 Is there a case for public subsidies? 
In this report we have discussed reasons why the social value of the Halten CO2 project may 
be larger than the private value, and thus be a candidate for public subsidies. The discussion 
has been performed under the assumption of a general incentive for CO2 reductions, as with a 
quota price paid for all sectors. Thus, the ‘subsidy’ discussed here is for an incentive over and 
beyond this. The “public good” reasons for providing such a benefit must be grounded 
primarily in spillovers from learning.  
The main reasons are due to technology learning-by-doing and spillover effects and the 
possibility that the government’s calculation of benefits and costs of the Halten CO2 project is 
based on other assumptions than private investors. 
We find that off-shore EOR is the project component that likely has the largest learning-by-
doing potential, and that the social value of the total Halten CO2 project is likely reduced 
without EOR. This learning-by-doing aspect and associated technology spillover potential 
therefore could be an argument for a relatively larger public subsidy of the project. In the 
absence of an EOR component in the Halten CO2 project, the likelihood for public subsidies 
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to be justified would increase if new technological solutions and design elements are 
included. To identify and maximize learning-by-doing effects Norway should, in coordination 
with efforts by EU and other interested countries, develop and test different CCS technologies 
and designs, allocate public subsidies towards a variety of technologies, solutions and designs 
so that these can be tested and compared. 
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